In this paper we describe risk calculations performed to estimate inhalation of beryllium resulting from operational and accidental releases at the RFP. We evaluated soil and sediment monitoring data for beryllium and studied evidence of carcinogenicity and chronic beryllium disease. We also describe environmental transport modeling, provide estimates of uncertainty in the model predictions, and present distributions of carcinogenic risk resulting from the inhalation of beryllium for several generic receptor scenarios.
In this paper we describe risk calculations performed to estimate inhalation of beryllium resulting from operational and accidental releases at the RFP. We evaluated soil and sediment monitoring data for beryllium and studied evidence of carcinogenicity and chronic beryllium disease. We also describe environmental transport modeling, provide estimates of uncertainty in the model predictions, and present distributions of carcinogenic risk resulting from the inhalation of beryllium for several generic receptor scenarios.
Beryllium Release Estimates
Beryllium was initially used in research and development in 1953. Beryllium operations became significant from 1958 to 1975 at the RFP. The details of beryllium component manufacturing, machining, cutting, heat treating, rolling, and other operations and ventilation systems used to control beryllium emissions over the years are described in technical reports by ChemRisk (1) and McGavran et al. (2) and in a letter written by Campbell (3) . With the possible exception of effluent from one building in the early 1960s, all air exhaust discharged from RFP beryllium-processing facilities was subjected to high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration to control radioactive effluents (4) .
Beryllium has been monitored in the plant air exhaust effluent since at least 1963 (1, 4, 5) . The monitoring program data for routine airborne emissions of beryllium provided the basis for the release estimates shown in Figure 1 . Beryllium emissions were determined from sample data log books for [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] and from annual beryllium releases reported in the annual environmental monitoring reports for [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] . The log books contain daily sample results for workroom air and building effluents. ChemRisk (4) calculated the monthly and annual average beryllium concentrations for each stack from the building effluent data. Because data on exhaust flow rates and total exhaust volume were lacking for some facilities, releases were estimated using facilities of similar size (4) . No sampling data from before 1960 were located. Therefore, we assumed that emissions in 1958 and 1959 were the same as those reported in 1960.
Air exhaust samples were taken from filter plenum exhausts after the air passed through HEPA filters but before it exited the stack. The sampling practices, sampling system design, sample line losses, calculations of flow rates, and exhaust volume and uncertainties determined previously for radioactive particles were applied to the beryllium sampling data (4) .
Beryllium was also released during three fires that occurred in 1962, 1964, and 1978 (6,7). These releases were monitored by the stack sampling equipment; therefore, they were included in the yearly release estimates (4) . The most significant fire occurred on 23 February 1978 . A release estimate of 14.5 g from the fire was included in the < 17-g release estimate for 1978. The 1978 release estimate was based on monitoring results from the plenum sampler, ambient air sampling, and samples of water used to fight the fire. The water that was used to fight the fire drained into and was sampled from ponds, ditches, and temporary impoundments (4, (8) (9) (10) .
Release estimates typically ranged from 10 to 30 g/year for the years 1958-1971 and generally were < 10 g/year after 1971. Documentation suggests that beryllium measurement data handling practices may have led to reporting annual emissions that were greater than actual releases (4 (4, 13, 14) .
Historically, inhalation of beryllium has been a greater human health concern than ingestion, in part because < 1% of ingested beryllium is absorbed through the gastrointestinal tract (15 (16, 17) .
In 1982, a site study was conducted to characterize sources of beryllium and to determine beryllium concentrations in soil (16) . This study estimated that 196 g beryllium was exhausted from all buildings which processed beryllium during the 24 (21) .
Time trend analysis suggests that the concentrations in onsite air appear unrelated to the amount of beryllium released from the plant (21) . The monitoring data support the atmospheric transport model predictions that offsite air concentrations of beryllium were well below background concentrations.
Beryllium was also present in waste, some of which was discharged into the solar evaporation ponds at the RFP. However, resuspension or leaching of beryllium in waste has not occurred at a level that warrants inclusion in our study.
Health Hazards of Beryllium
To understand the health hazards ofberyllium, it is important to review the regulatory standards for beryllium in air, the evidence of carcinogenicity, and the literature on chronic beryllium disease. Because of its use in the nuclear weapons industry, the Atomic Energy Commission recommended occupational and community ambient air standards for beryllium in 1949 (22) . These standards greatly reduced exposures in and around beryllium plants. The (26,30-32. Additional studies in the 1990s found excess risk of lung cancer in workers enrolled in the beryllium case registry (33) . Occupational exposure to beryllium compounds was the most plausible explanation for the increased risk of lung cancer observed in these studies (34 Studies implicating beryllium as an occupational carcinogen have examined lung cancer in cohorts exposed in the 1930s and 1940s-before industrial hygiene controls were in place and when concentrations were orders of magnitude higher than permitted today. Statistically significant increases in lung cancer have been difficult to demonstrate in workers exposed to lower levels (36 Factors that identify immunologic hypersensitivity indude the insidious nature of the disease, a long latency between exposure and onset, the granulomatous nature of the lung lesions that develop, berylliosis patients' delayed skin hypersensitivity reactions to beryllium compounds, peripheral blood lymphocytes and bronchoalveolar lymphocytes in people with chronic beryllium disease that undergo blast transformation and release a migration inhibition factor after exposure to beryllium in vitro, and the lack of a dose-response relationship (29, (38) (39) (40) (41) .
Susceptibility to sensitization is likely to have a genetic basis. Recently, a genetic marker was identified in people with sensitivity to beryllium (42) . It was concluded that people with this genetic marker have a significantly increased probability of developing sensitization than those without it (43) . However, it appears that approximately 30% of the population has the genetic marker and, at most, only about 2-15% of exposed workers become sensitized (23) .
Most commonly, researchers estimate that 1-5% of beryllium-exposed workers develop chronic beryllium disease (25, 44, 45) . Sensitization rates may be higher: Kriess et al. (46) reported rates of 2.9-15.8% for beryllium-exposed persons.
Most cases of chronic beryllium disease have occurred in people working in industries processing or using beryllium; however, cases of chronic beryllium disease have been reported in people living near processing plants and in families of beryllium workers, perhaps from exposure to airborne beryllium carried from a plant or from handling contaminated workers' dothing. Chronic beryllium disease has also developed in people in the nonprocessing areas of factories; these people were likely exposed to small amounts of beryllium (25, 29, 47, 48) . Although Kriess et al. (46) reported that the degree of beryllium exposure was associated with disease rates, they found that sensitization occurred in workers with exposures as short as 1 month or in people with unrecognized exposure.
The occurrence of beryllium disease in those with inadvertent or seemingly trivial exposure has been reported in secretaries and security guards at the RFP (46) and other facilities (23), a janitor in a ceramics company (23) , and in members of workers' households and neighbors around beryllium extraction plants (22, 32, 44) . Cases of chronic beryllium disease that occur in people living in the vicinity of the beryllium plants are termed neighborhood cases (27) .
In a report summarizing the relationship between the incidence of nonoccupationally related cases of chronic beryllium disease and the levels of atmospheric contamination in the area of a beryllium extraction plant, Eisenbud et al. (22) observed that the incidence of disease was a function of the concentration to which the residents were exposed. The incidence of disease within 1/4 mile was approximately 1%, or 5 of 500 people (22) . The cases of chronic beryllium disease in the 1930s and 1940s in Salem, Massachusetts, occurred almost entirely in fluorescent lamp manufacturing workers. The exceptions were three neighborhood cases: a night watchman, a near neighbor, and a housewife with two young women who were fluorescent lamp workers living in her home. Protection was minimal, and workers were exposed to high levels ofberyllium phosphors (29) .
Chronic beryllium disease was epidemic in the 1940s, leading to the establishment of the beryllium case registry in 1951 (23, 27 (23, 43) and that the limit designed to protect the general public may not be low enough (41) . The EPA considers the ambient air standard protective for the public with ample margin of safety (27) .
Evidence exists for biologic responses and possible sensitization occurring after exposure to levels far below the current threshold limit values (23, 41) . In the 1998 EPA toxicological review, EPA researchers stated that several studies observed chronic beryllium disease in people chronically exposed in modern plants that are generally in compliance with the workplace standard for beryllium (the permissible exposure limit) of 2 pg/m3 (32) .
A clear dose-response relationship or duration of exposure-response relationship has not been established for chronic beryllium disease, which is interpreted as involving a delayed hypersensitivity that may be induced by low exposures. Chronic beryllium disease can develop in people with relatively low exposures, whereas nonsensitized people experiencing high exposures may not develop the disease (30, 31, 38) . Even slightly exposed individuals, such as the neighborhood cases, sometimes show severe clinical forms of the disease (22, 29) .
Recent studies published by Kriess et al. (46) The relative risk estimates were used to provide a probable range and central value rather than just a 95% confidence limit value. The occupational epidemiologic study on whic4, the cancer potency determination was based reported a range for median exposure of 100-1,000 jig/m3. Furthermore, an assumption was made that the ratio of exposure duration to years at risk ranged from 0.25 to 1.0. The mean of the potency factors derived using these assumptions was reported in the IRIS database (37). The maximum and minimum values (27) Table 2 .
Model domain and receptor grid. The model domain (Figure 2) Roughness elements (such as trees and buildings) and small-scale topographic features (such as rolling hills) have a frictional effect on the wind speed nearest the surface. The height and spacing of these elements determine the frictional effects on the wind. These effects are directly related to transport and diffusion and affect atmospheric stability, wind profiles, diffusion coefficients, and the mixing-layer depth. The surface roughness length parameter is used to describe these roughness elements and is a characteristic length associated with surface roughness elements. In RATCHET, estimates of the surface roughness length are defined for each node on the environmental grid. Prediction uncertainty. We accounted for model prediction uncertainty by using several multiplicative stochastic correction factors in the dispersion estimate, the meteorology, and deposition and plume depletion. Dispersion uncertainty was based on distributions on predicted-to-observed ratios from field tracer experiments using the Gaussian plume and other models including RATCH-ET. We derived these values from literature reviews and results from studies specific to this project. Meteorologic uncertainty arises because we used 5 years of meteorologic data spanning a recent time period (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) to define an annual average XIQ value that applied to all previous years of the assessment period . This correction factor was derived from studies performed for the Fernald Dosimetry Reconstruction Project (66) Figure 4 is an isopleth map of the annual average XIQ values in the model domain for releases from building 444. We generated isopleth maps using XIQ data gridded using the minimum curvature routine found in the Surfer software (67) .
The dispersion patterns are characterized by an east-northeast trending ellipsoidshaped plume. Wind roses constructed using RFP data from 1984-1993 (14) indicate that the predominant wind direction is from the west-northwest. Higher concentration isopleths near the source trend mostly easterly; however, farther away from the source, concentration isopleths trend to the northeast. The northeast trend is believed to be due to the influence of the Platte River Valley and the diurnal pattern of upslopedownslope conditions that characterize the general air movement on the Colorado Front Range environs (68) . Downslope conditions typically occur during the evening hours and are characterized by drainage flow ;X/Qj xQj xCF1 xCF2x CF3 [2] j=1 where X7Q,. = dispersion factor for source j (concentration divided by source term, year/m3), Q = annual release of beryllium for the ih year forfh source (building 776 or 444), CF1 = dispersion uncertainty correction factor, CF2 = meteorology uncertainty correction factor, and CF3 = plume depletion uncertainty correction factor.
The correction factors and source term are stochastic quantities; therefore, the concentration is also a stochastic quantity. The concentration to which a hypothetical receptor is exposed is the sum of the prediction concentrations from building 776 and 444 releases. Median value predicted concentrations at the location of highest concentration outside the buffer zone (east of the plant along Indiana Street) for all years in the assessment ranged from 1.3 x 10-6 ng/m3 in 1986 to 7.3 x 10-4 ng/m3 in 1968, the year of the highest release ( Figure 5 ). The maximum concentration in the model domain for 1968 was calculated within the plant buffer zone and ranged from 2.5 x 10-3 ng/m3 (5th percentile) to 6.8 x 10-2 ng/m3 (95th percentile). This can be compared to an annual average natural background range of 0.03-0.3 ng/m3 (median of 1 x 10-1 ng/m3), as estimated in Rope et al. (20) . Note that the predicted offsite concentrations would be indistinguishable from background concentrations.
We calculated the concentration of beryllium in soil from airborne deposition at the location of highest deposition outside the buffer zone and east of the plant along Indiana Street. We converted integrated surface deposition from 1958 to 1989 to soil concentration by conservatively assuming a sampling depth of 1 cm (0.4 inches) and a bulk density of 1.5 g/cm3. Predicted soil concentrations ranged from 6.9 x 10-6 (5th percentile) to 2.6 x 10-4 mg/kg (95th percentile), with a median value (50th percentile) of 4.2 x 10-5 mg/kg. These values are well below the mean background soil concenyration of 0.66 mg/kg. These calculations support the condusions of Barrick (16) and Allen and Litaor (19) that soil concentrations in the vicinity of the plant were not above background and showed no spatial trends or recognizable plumes. We calculated time-integrated concentrations on a receptor-specific basis and integrated concentrations over the duration of time a receptor resided in a given location in the model domain.
Exposure scenarios. One of the key parts of the Rocky Flats dose reconstruction work is calculating health impacts to people living in the surrounding area from materials released during RFP past operations. Dose reconstruction uses a pathways approach to study the potential radiation doses and health risks of past releases on the surrounding communities. The pathways approach begins with learning the types and quantities of materials that were released from a facility and ends with estimating the health impacts which these releases had on the residents in the area. We used mathematical models to model the transport of materials released from the site to the surrounding communities. The following paragraphs describe how we calculated health impacts (lifetime cancer incidence risk) to hypothetical people living offsite from exposure to these releases.
It Risks were calculated from historical beryllium releases from the RFP for nine hypothetical exposure scenarios (Table 5) . Inhalation was the only pathway of exposure considered in the assessment. Ingestion of beryllium in water and food and inhalation of deposited beryllium and beryllium attached to soil could have been considered in more detail. However, beryllium compounds are insoluble and tend to adhere to soil, making them relatively immobile and not readily taken up by plants or accumulating in the edible portions of animal products.
Exposure scenarios for the nine hypothetical receptors described in Table 5 and rates for children 0-7 years of age from Layton (70) .
We also based the time budgets for various receptor activities on Roy and Courtay (69) (Table 6 ), but we modified them to fit specific exposure scenarios. We assigned the fraction of time spent at a specific exercise level while engaged in a given activity based on the nature of the activity. For example, the fraction of time spent at the resting exercise level while the receptor slept would be 1.0 TICi,j = CF, -CF CF [4] where XIQ0 = dispersion factor for source] and location i (year/i3), Q.,=source term for year I and source j (mg/year), CF1 = stochastic correction factor for dispersion (unitless), CF2 = stochastic correction factor meteorology (unitless), CF3 = stochastic correction factor for deposition and plume depletion (unidess), n = number of years exposed, and At= time increment (1 year Fourth, percentiles, geometric mean, and geometric standard deviation values were where I= intake of beryllium by the receptor for the exposure period (mg), TIC12j = time-integrated concentration for occupational and nonoccupational (including sleeping) locations and ph source (mg-year/m), WBR123 = time-weighted average breathing rate for occupational, nonoccupational, and sleeping activity (m3/hr), and T1,2,3 = hours per year for occupational, nonoccupational, and sleeping activity (hr4year).
The subscripts 1, 2, and 3 refer to occupational, nonoccupational, and sleeping activity, respectively. The time-integrated concentration values (Table 7) are only calculated at two locations, and the same timeintegrated concentration value is applied to sleeping and nonoccupational awake activities. Distributions of time-integrated concentration values in Table 7 are described in terms of their geometric mean and geometric standard deviation. Analyses of the data Table 7 . Time-integrated concentrations for each receptor scenario and source for occupational and nonoccupational activities.
then calculated from the distribution of m risk values.
We calculated the total risk over the lifetime of the individual that represents the infant, child, and student scenarios differently. For each trial, contaminant dose (intake divided by body weight, in milligrams per kilogram) was calculated for each year the receptor was exposed. Note that body weight and breathing rate change as the individual matures. Meteorologic, deposition, and source term uncertainty were applied to each year's dose estimate. The dose was summed across all years of exposure, then multiplied by the dispersion correction factor and slope factor and divided by the averaging time. This process was repeated m times, resulting in a distribution of lifetime cancer risk estimates to the individual.
We adapted FORTRAN routines for generating random numbers and selecting values from normal, lognormal, triangular, and uniform distributions from Press et al. (72) . The output distributions provided in this article were generated from 2,000 trials.
Risk estimates. The lifetime cancer incidence risks reported here represent the precision in the models and methodology used in the calculation. They should not be used to determine the probability that a real individual within the population will develop cancer. Geometric mean incremental lifetime cancer incidence risk estimates for beryllium inhalation (Table 8) were highest for the rancher scenario (3.9 x 10-10) and lowest for the retiree scenario (7.5 x 10-13). The 5th and 95th percentile values of the risk estimates are illustrated in Figure 6 . The range of values shown represent the 5th and 95th percentiles on the cumulative density function.
Using the rancher scenario as an example, these risks may be interpreted as follows: * There is a 90% probability that the incremental lifetime cancer incidence risk to the rancher was between 7.5 x 10Tl (5% value) and 1.8 x 10-9 (95% value) Fotal (child} represents the integrated risk for the infant, child, and student scenarios. * There is a 5% probability that the incremental lifetime cancer incidence risk for the rancher was > 8.4 x 10-9 (100% value) * There is also a 5% probability that the incremental lifetime cancer risk for the rancher was < 7.5 x 10-11. Estimated risks were a function of exposure time, exposure duration, and location of exposure. Risk is inversely proportional to body weight, which explains the relatively high risk for the infant scenario. We did not consider age and sex dependencies; furthermore, few data exist to develop such values. Therefore, the risks presented here for the infant, child, and student scenarios must be interpreted with caution because SA for adults were used to compute carcinogenic risk.
Risk estimates are well below the EPA point of departure for acceptable risks (10-6 to 10-4). As stated previously, the EPA SF values were not intended to represent the true carcinogenic risk to an individual, but were designed to be protective of human health. The risk values reported here, therefore, should be evaluated in light of the EPA point of departure for acceptable risk.
The rancher scenario represents the maximum exposed individual in the model domain because the rancher was placed at the point of highest concentration outside the RFP buffer zone and remained there for the entire operating period of the plant. However, it is recognized that in the past, ranchers could have had cattle grazing within the current buffer zone. There were also bunkhouses or some type of permanent overnight ranch camps to the northeast within the buffer zone. To increase the risk substantially from our estimates, the concentration within the buffer zone would have had to be several orders of magnitude greater than outside the buffer zone. However, this is not the case, as evidenced by the XIQ data presented in Figure 4 and differences between the predicted concentration at Indiana Street and the maximum concentration in the model domain. The resulting risk, accounting for occupancy time while exposed to concentrations within the buffer zone, would still be at or below the EPA point of departure for acceptable risk of 10-6 to 10-4.
Although beryllium exposures for workers at the RFP have been of great concern and the attention to workers may have caused public concern about health effects due to beryllium exposure offsite, the results of this assessment predicted that lung cancer risk from beryllium exposures offsite was negligible. The risk for chronic beryllium disease in the offsite public is uncertain. The maximum concentration estimated in the entire model domain occurred onsite and ranged from 2.5 x 10-6 (5% value) to 6.8 x 10-pg/m3 (95% value). These concentrations were approximately 300 times less than the EPA RfC of 2.0 x 10-2 pg/m3. The maximum concentration predicted along Indiana Avenue ranged from 9.4 x 10-7 to 1.4 x 10-5 pg/m3, concentrations more than 1,400 times less than the RfC. A hazard index calculated using these values would be well below 1. However, because of the complexity and apparent immunologic nature of chronic beryllium disease, it is difficult to conclude that no cases of chronic beryllium disease may have occurred from offsite exposure.
